Tuesday 13 / January / 2026
In the autumn of 1979, broad popular alliances toppled the Shah’s regime, driven by a mixture of accumulated domestic grievances: political tyranny and repression via the SAVAK, rampant administrative corruption, and a deteriorating economy that consumed the middle class.
The revolution was not an isolated event, but the result of a complex interaction between combustible internal factors, an alternative ideological framework (political Islam) provided by the clergy under Khomeini’s leadership, and the crucial weakening of external support for the Shah at the decisive moment.
Today, more than four decades later, the Islamic Republic faces a seemingly paradoxical situation: on one hand, it is more security-cohesive than the Shah’s regime, yet on the other, it appears to be reproducing the very conditions of discontent, albeit within a different ideological framework.
A new political tyranny is concentrated around unelected institutions (the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards), structural corruption is rampant within semi-governmental economic giants, and a collapsing economy (runaway inflation, a plummeting currency, rampant unemployment) is pushing the middle class—the backbone of any stability—into abject poverty. These internal factors alone are sufficient to create a permanent ground for protest.
External intervention: The fuel that feeds the fire and hardens the walls
However, the picture is incomplete without understanding the role of the external factor, which has transformed from a mere geopolitical adversary into an active variable in Iran’s internal equation.
The American policy of “maximum pressure,” with its comprehensive sanctions package that has strangled oil and financial sectors, has not only weakened the economy but has turned the siege into a daily living reality for millions. This reality directly fuels public discontent against the government that has failed to provide protection. In parallel, Iran faces an intensive external security and intelligence campaign, primarily accusing Israel of assassinating scientists and striking vital facilities, creating a state of permanent alert and weakening the state’s sense of sovereignty.
Yet the most dangerous impact of this external intervention may lie in the realm of legitimacy and propaganda context. The Iranian regime skillfully transforms these external pressures into tools for internal mobilization. Every hostile act from abroad—a sanction or a sabotage operation—is presented as evidence of a “global conspiracy” against Iran and is used to justify any internal repressive measure under the banner of “defending the homeland.” Indeed, some reports and mutual accusations suggest that external elements may encourage, directly or indirectly, limited acts of violence within Iran (such as targeting security personnel or burning minor government facilities). These acts, even if marginal compared to the widespread peaceful movement, provide the authorities with the golden bullet they seek: a distorted image of protest as destructive and violent, thereby justifying comprehensive repression and portraying themselves as protectors of security and stability against “agents.” Thus, external pressure becomes a double-edged sword: it accelerates internal deterioration while simultaneously providing the regime with propaganda ammunition that allows it to postpone being held accountable by the street for its failures.
From revolution to crisis management: coexisting with failure under siege
In this climate charged both internally and externally, Iran no longer faces separate, solvable crises, but has entered a phase of “managing chronic failure.” The economy did not collapse overnight but is eroding in a slow-motion fall, transforming the currency’s collapse into a collective psychological state of despair. Periodic protests are not surprising but are a repeated expression of a broken social contract, where the regime leverages external pressure to justify its inability to fulfill its domestic promises. Even the regime’s ambitious foreign policy—and its regional influence—is now weighed on the scales of the ordinary citizen. The question resonating powerfully is: “What have we gained from all this regional glory and resistance, if we cannot buy meat or find a job?”
The trade-off has shifted from the ideological realm to the purely economic one, creating a silent rift between the state’s discourse and the concerns of its people.
Conclusion: No sudden collapse, but erosion in the face of a declared external enemy
This complex equation does not necessarily point to an imminent revolution akin to 1979. The current regime is more security-cohesive and more capable of using the card of “confrontation with the outside” to neutralise internal discontent.
But it points to a more dangerous trajectory: the trajectory of a state learning to survive in a state of postponed collapse. The ability to “manage crises” is not a sign of health, but a pathological coexistence with the disease.
Iran today is not in freefall but is sliding down a slope. Internal factors—repression, corruption, and economic collapse—are what dug this slope. External pressures and interventions, however, contribute in a dual manner: on one hand, they push the state down the slope faster by strangling the economy, and on the other, they provide the authorities with tools to build temporary security and propaganda barriers that slow the fall, without changing its ultimate direction.
The greatest danger lies not in explosion, but in becoming accustomed to living within the circle of managed failure, where the worst becomes acceptable, the acceptable becomes the norm, and the external enemy becomes an eternal pretext to justify every internal shortcoming. States do not fall when they hit rock bottom, but when they become accustomed to living there, convincing themselves that this bottom is the last line of defense for their identity in a hostile world.
